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Abstract: The productive behaviour of some selected Africa countries is investigated through 
protection of intellectual property rights. The study makes use of secondary data spanning within 1995 
and 2015 and used dynamic panel GMM technique to analyse the data. It was observed that in the 
selected countries, protection of intellectual property right had a negative impact on economic growth 
in the selected countries. The implication of this is that, developing countries must seek ways of 
protecting intellectual property assets without compromising their objective of industrial growth and 
development.  
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1. Introduction 
The impact of intellectual property rights (henceforth IPR) in influencing scientific 
research, inventions, productivity and hence economic growth has attracted the 
interests of academics, researchers, policymakers, government and international 
organizations in the last two centuries (Jefferson, 1807; Rodrik, 2000; Mingaleva & 
Mirskikh, 2013; ICC, 2015). Intellectual Property rights enable individuals, 
corporate organizations and inventors enjoy flow of revenues through the 
enforcement of monopoly powers from their innovations and intellectual properties. 
These involve copyrights, Trademarks, Trade Secrets, Patents, Innovations and 
Inventions (Jefferson, 1807; Rodrik, 2000; Mingaleva & Mirskikh, 2013).  
The debates on the use of IPRs has taken another dimension in the context of 
developing countries, it has been argued that the protection of IPR might have 
negative effect on the growth of developing countries. This school of thought argued 
that the per capita income in developing countries is very low and hence the 
population is unable to afford the purchase of inventions, technology, copyrights, 
patents, trademarks and innovations that are very expedient for technological 
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diffusion, increased productivity which facilitates economic growth among these 
countries. Hence, it is advocated by this school of thought that the IPR should not be 
protected among these countries. 
On the other hand, another school of thought has emerged arguing against the weak 
protection of IPR among developing countries. According to this school, IPR, if 
properly managed and protected could become a veritable source of sustainable 
revenue as witnessed among knowledge-driven economies like US, UK, Japan, 
Germany among others (Raymond, 1996; ICC, 2015). For instance, Intellectual 
Property industries generated 17% of the GDP of the USA in 2003 (Economic 
Reports of the President, 2004) while ten of the industries in this sector generated 
over 8% of the UK’s GDP and 36.7% of the industrial output (Raymond, 1998; ICC, 
2015). These economies have relinquished most of their primary production 
activities to the developing countries like China and African countries while relying 
on copyright, patents, royalties on their innovations and inventions for generating 
and yielding huge revenue which is made possible by the availability of the effective 
and efficient intellectual property rights protection.  
Since the IPR was enacted by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994, the 
relationship between IPR’s protection and economic growth has attracted an 
unending argument among researchers. However, there has not been consensus on 
the impact of protection of property rights in attracting inventions, productivity and 
economic growth among researchers. In developed countries, Studies have reported 
negative relationship.(for example, Glaeser et al., 2004; Fogel, 2004; McArthur & 
Sachs, 2001; Schmid, 2006; Falvey et al., 2006; Sakakibara & Branstetter, 2001; 
Thompson & Rushing, 1999; Angeles, 2011; Azevedo, Afonso & Silva, 2013; Ofili, 
2014; Lewer & Saenz, 2015). These studies reported that tight protection of property 
rights would hinder imitation which is a significant source of technological 
development and thus slow down economic growth. On the other hand, studies like: 
Gruben (1996); Kanwar and Evensong (2003); Daley, 2014; DFID, 2014; 
Haydaroglu (2015); Nwabachili & Nwabachili(2015) argued that strengthening 
property rights leads to a significant positive effect on generating innovation, 
inventions and consequently economic growth among countries. 
Though, the debate on IPR and economic growth started among African developing 
countries after the enforcement of the IPR by the WTO in 2005. Empirical evidences 
from developing countries have been very scarce. To the best of our knowledge, the 
only existing studies on the subject among African countries are: Sakakibara & 
Branstetter (2001); Kanwar and Evenson (2003); Ofili, (2014) and Nwabachili & 
Nwabachili (2015) which reported mixed results. In addition, these studies are 
conducted on individual countries while most are not empirical (Kanwar & Evenson, 
2003; Nwabachili & Nwabachili, 2015). Furthermore, existing studies in advanced 
countries have employed static panel models using fixed and random effects thereby 
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neglecting the impacts of persistence in economic growth in modelling the 
relationship. These issues are therefore addressed in this study. 
Unlike existing studies on African countries, this study employs a panel dataset using 
a panel of thirty-six African countries to investigate the relationship between 
property right protection and economic growth, to the best of our knowledge being 
the first study to employ panel method among studies on developing countries and 
African countries in particular. The study adopts the panel data analysis method due 
to the inconsistency in the use of OLS as an estimator of the growth regression. The 
problems of OLS as an estimator are highlighted to include; first, the regression 
disturbance term may include some unobserved country effects that may be 
correlated with the regressors employed. Second, some of the regressors may be 
correlated with shocks that affect income per capita. Also, there is possibility of 
simultaneity biases resulting from the endogeneity of some growth determinants 
such as property rights. To overcome these econometric problems, we employed the 
fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) estimators. In this study, we report and 
compare results obtained from these estimators and we also conduct some diagnostic 
tests to complement the estimation techniques. 
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 provides the literature review. 
Section 3 discusses the Data sources and Methodology. Section 4 presents the results 
and discussion. Section 5 contains the conclusion and recommendations from the 
findings. 
 
2. Literature Review 
In the growth literature it has been identified that secure property rights is one of the 
key reasons why some countries are so rich while some are so poor. Countries that 
are able to ensure secure property rights grow faster while countries that lack secure 
property rights grow slowly (McArthur& Sachs, 2001). Property rights internalize 
costs and benefits and provide the proper incentives for good stewardship of 
resources. 
Economists have identified at least four ways that insecure property rights negatively 
affect economic activities. Besley and Ghatak (2009) have recently summarized 
these four aspects. First, insecure or weakly enforced property rights increase the 
risk of expropriation, which diminishes incentives to invest and to produce. Second, 
insecure property rights decrease productivity by necessitating the need to defend 
property. Third, insecure property rights fail to facilitate gains from trade (i.e., if 
property rights are not full or entirely secure, assets sometimes cannot be transferred 
to those who can use them most productively). Finally, property right serves as an 
important tool in supporting other transactions such as obtaining financing via its 
role as collateral (Besley & Ghatak, 2009). 
ISSN: 2065-0175                                                                                              ŒCONOMICA 
173 
In the modern literature on economic growth, technological progress is viewed as 
the prime determinant of long-run growth. This technological progress arises from 
the activities of economic agents carried out in order to profit from the introduction 
of new products (Romer, 1990) or the improvement of existing ones (Aghion & 
Howitt, 1992). Agents invest in research and development in the expectation of 
making profit from the inventions. But besides creating new products, innovative 
activity adds to society’s stock of knowledge, upon which subsequent innovations 
are based. This process is assisted where potential inventors has the information that 
property rights are protected.  
However, there is no consensus in the literature about the exact impact of protection 
of property rights on incentive to invest in particular, and growth in general. 
According to Leger (2006), by giving temporary exclusive rights on inventors, the 
right-holders will price their products above marginal cost, and hence recover their 
initial research investment. Such right creates motivation for the conduct of research 
and development, which contributes to the promotion of technological innovation 
and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, in a manner conducive to social 
and economic welfare. Conversely, Kanwar (2006) claimed that strengthening 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) could lead to greater innovation in developed 
countries, which in turn, could be helpful for developing countries.  
Stign and Laeven (2002) argued that the existence of an environment with poorly 
developed financial systems and weak property rights have two effects on firms: 
first, it reduces the access of firms to external financing; and, second, it leads firms 
to allocate resources in a suboptimal way. They investigate the importance of 
property rights for firm growth by studying its impact on firms’ allocation of 
investable resources. They show that the effect of insecure property rights on the 
asset mix of firms, the asset allocation effect, is economically as important as the 
lack of financing effect as it impedes the growth of firms to the same quantitative 
magnitude. Furthermore, the asset allocation effect seems to be particularly 
important in hindering the growth of new firms. While they use the ratio of tangibles 
and intangible assets as a measure of asset mix, the implications of their results likely 
go beyond this particular asset choice and indicate that an efficient allocation of firm 
resources can be more generally impeded by weak property rights. Their results 
suggest that the degree to which firms allocate resources in an optimal way will 
depend on the strength of a country’s property rights and that the allocation effect is 
an important channel in explaining the effect of property rights on firm growth. Thus, 
their results have the important policy implication that, equally important as the 
establishment of a good financial system, requiring in turn a functioning legal 
system, is assuring the protection of returns to different type of assets. To the extent 
that the emergence of the “new economy” has increased the economic returns to 
assets on which yields are more difficult to secure, then their results would even 
underestimate the overall costs of weak property rights. If indeed new economy 
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assets and future growth opportunities are more related to intangible assets, then any 
under allocation of investable resources towards intangible assets is likely to impede 
the future growth of firms and the economies. However, these submissions had been 
empirically validated over the years by different scholars. 
Empirically, in the institutional economics literature, for example, North (1990) 
suggested that investment in particular types of assets will be higher if there is more 
protection of property rights of the assets. Besley (1995) showed the role of property 
rights for investment incentives and provides evidence of the importance of property 
rights in the context of land ownership by farmers in Ghana. Johnson, McMillan and 
Woodruff (2002) showed for a sample of firms in post-communist countries that 
weaker property rights discourage the reinvestment of firm earnings, even when 
bank loans are available suggesting that secure property rights are both a necessary 
and sufficient condition for entrepreneurial investment.  
The role of property rights in affecting investment patterns has also been 
acknowledged, although less explicitly studied. Mansfield (1995) hinted that there 
may be a relationship between protection of property rights and the allocation of 
investable resources between fixed and intangible assets. Using a survey of firm 
managers, he states that “most of the firms we contacted seemed to regard 
intellectual property rights protection to be an important factor” … “[influencing] 
investment decisions”. Stern, Porter and Furman (2000) showed how the strength of 
a country’s intellectual property rights affects its innovative capacity, by measuring 
the degree of international patenting. In developing countries, the lower degree of 
investment in intangible assets may relate to the weaker protection of property rights.  
Gould and Gruben (1996) employed RRI to examine the importance of stronger IPR 
protection for growth in a sample of up to 95 countries with data averaged over the 
period 1960-1988. They also examined whether the impact of IPR protection on 
growth depends upon the degree of openness to trade. The underlying argument 
being that in closed economies, stronger IPR protection may not have the desired 
effect of encouraging innovation and higher growth, as firms may not have the 
incentive to innovate if their market is guaranteed. The model of Rivera-Batiz and 
Romer (1991) provided a theoretical rationale for this hypothesis, with firms in 
closed economies finding it more profitable to copy foreign technology than develop 
new technology. Both of these indices are based primarily on the statutes themselves, 
but not on their enforcement or implementation. Consequently, these indices may 
overestimate the level of protection in a country where strong anti-infringement laws 
exist, but are not enforced as may be the case in many developing countries that 
inherited IPR laws from their colonial powers, but do not have the administrative 
capacity or inclination to enforce them (Gould & Gruben, 1996). 
The index or measures of IPRs are included as a variable in a regression model that 
usually employs panel regression for studies that focus on more than one country 
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while method like ordinary least square and seemingly unrelated regression have 
been used as well. Kanwar and Evenson (2003) estimated a panel model for up to 32 
countries between 1981 and 1990; Thompson and Rushing (1999) employed a 
simultaneous equation model to estimate the impact of IPRs on economic growth; 
Moore (2007) looked at the impact of intellectual property rights (IPRs) on economic 
growth for a cross-section of 34 Sub-Saharan (SSA) using three different estimation 
techniques of Ordinary Least Squares, seemingly unrelated regressions, and Fixed 
effects panel method.  
However, studies that focus on optimal level of policy variables have employed 
threshold regression. Thompson and Rushing (1996) employed threshold regression 
techniques and regress the average growth of real GDP per capita between 1970 and 
1985 on the ratio of investment to GDP, the secondary school enrolment ratio, 
population growth, initial GDP per capita and the RRI for 112 countries. Thompson 
and Rushing (1999) extended the work of Thompson and Rushing (1996) to a system 
of three equations. The three dependent variables are: the growth rate of real GDP 
per capita, the ratio of total factor productivity (TFP) in 1971 to that in 1990 and the 
RRI. The system is estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
techniques for 55 developed and developing countries. Falvey, Foster and 
Greenaway (2004) extend and update the single equation analysis by employing the 
recently developed threshold techniques of Hansen (1996, 1999 and 2000). These 
allow the positioning and significance of a threshold to be identified, as well as the 
possibility of having more than one threshold. They use the GPI and a panel of up to 
80 countries with data averaged over four five-year periods between 1975 and 1994. 
However, the result does not change from Thompson and Rushing (1996).  
Rod, Neil and David (2006) investigated the impact of IPR protection on economic 
growth in a panel of 79 countries using threshold regression analysis. They show that 
whilst the effect of IPR protection on growth depends upon the level of development, 
it is positively and significantly related to growth for low- and high-income 
countries, but not for middle-income countries. This suggests that, although IPR 
protection encourages innovation in high-income countries, and technology flows to 
low-income countries, middle-income countries may have offsetting losses from 
reduced scope for imitation. 
Gould and Gruben (1996) estimated a growth model on a cross-section of up to 95 
countries with data averaged over the period 1960–88, including in their regression 
the IPR measure of Rapp and Rozek (1990). They find that IPR protection has a 
significant positive impact on growth. Thompson and Rushing (1996) estimated 
cross-section growth regressions including up to 112 countries for the period 1970–
85, again using the Rapp and Rozek measure. While they find positive coefficients 
on the IPR variable, they are never significant. Both of these studies also considered 
non-linearities in the relationship. Gould and Gruben (1996) examine whether IPR 
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protection affects growth in open versus closed economies differently, by interacting 
their measure of IPRs with three measures of a country’s trade orientation. Their 
results suggested that 
IPR protection can have a slightly larger impact on open economies, but only for one 
measure is the coefficient ever significant and even then its significance is not robust 
to the inclusion of other variables. 
Thompson and Rushing (1996) employed a switching regression model to examine 
whether increased IPR protection is more beneficial once a country has reached a 
particular level of development, as measured by initial GDP per capita. Their results 
indicated a break point at an initial level of GDP of $3400 (1980 dollars). For 
countries below this no relationship is found, but above it a positive and significant 
relationship is reported. They only test for the presence of a single break, however, 
which may give misleading results if more than one break is present. 
Using a sample of ten countries in the post-TRIPS era, Daley (2014) examined the 
impact of national IPR level on FDI and imports. The empirical findings analysis 
revealed a positive relationship between intellectual property rights protection on 
FDI and imports. According to the study, on average, the results show that a one-
point increase in the IPR score (about 10 percent) will increase a country’s FDI by 
$1.5 billion (50 percent of the mean amount) and imports by $8.9 billion (40 percent 
of the mean amount). (Lesser 19) As a result, countries, should consider this positive 
relationship when devising IPR policy. Similarly, Haydaroglu (2015) investigated 
the relationship among OECD and EU countries and introduced institutional quality 
into the debates between 2007 and 2014 using ARDL, the empirical result showed 
that there is positive relationship between protection of property right and economic 
growth among these countries. The study further documented that institutional 
quality plays important roles if intellectual property rights is going to have positive 
effect on economic growth especially among the developing countries that exhibit 
weak institutions. Other studies supporting positive relationship includes: Locke, 
2013; DFID, 2014; Nwabachili and Nwabachili (2015). 
However, Azevedo, Afonso and Silva (2013) documented a negative relationship 
between intellectual property rights and economic growth, using a North-South 
general equilibrium endogenous growth model that emphasizes the IPR enforcement 
effects on growth, in a scenario of North-South technological knowledge diffusion, 
the study reported that in steady state, the increases in IPR protection result in 
decreases in the growth rate. In the same view, Ofili (2014) documented a negative 
relationship on the debates in Nigeria. The study reported that IPRs protection has 
negative and insignificant relationship with the rate of innovation in developing 
countries. 
In conclusion, the empirical review showed that the empirical studies on the 
relationship between intellectual rights protection is advanced in the developed 
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countries while empirical evidences on the developing countries and in Africa is 
scarce. Still, the existing few studies are individual-country specific though these 
countries exhibit similar characteristics in per capita income level, ideology, political 
institutions and economic performance, hence, there is need for a study like this for 
robustness. 
 
3. Model Specification  
Following Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), Islam (1995), Caselli, Esquivel and 
Lefort (1996) and Hoeffler (2000), technological progress 𝑔 and depreciation 𝛿 rate 
are assumed to be constant across countries and that they sum to 0.05. Therefore, the 
sum of population growth and 0.05 gives values for (n + g +  δ). Finally, the index 
of property rights of the heritage foundation is used as measure for property rights. 
The study followed the advanced model of Solow (1956) by Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil (1992). Solow’s model takes the rates of savings, population growth and 
technological progress as exogenous. The production function has two inputs, capital 
and labour, which are paid their marginal product. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas 
version of this production function, hence production at time 𝑡 can be specified as: 
𝑌(𝑡) =  𝐾(𝑡)
𝛼 (𝐴(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡))
1−𝛼
         0 < 𝛼 < 1        (1) 
Where 𝑌(𝑡) is output at time 𝑡, 𝐾 is physical capital, 𝐿 is labour and 𝐴 is level of 
technology, while 𝐴𝐿 is effective labour. Human capital can be introduced into 
equation to obtain the augmented Solow model specified by Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil (1992), such as: 
𝑌(𝑡) =  𝐾(𝑡)
𝛼 𝐻(𝑡)
𝛽 (𝐴(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡))
1−𝛼−𝛽
    0 < 𝛼 + 𝛽 < 1              (2)  
Where 𝐻 is the stock of human capital and other variables are as defined above. It is 
assumed that 𝐴 and 𝐿 grow exogenously at rates: 
𝐿(𝑡) =  𝐿(0)𝑒
𝑛𝑡                 (3) 
𝐴(𝑡) =  𝐴(0)𝑒
𝑔𝑡  (4)  
Therefore, the units of effective labour 𝐴(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡) grows at rate 𝑛 + 𝑔.  
Output per effective labour is expressed as 𝑦 =  𝑌 𝐴𝐿⁄ , physical capital per effective 
labour 𝑘 =  𝐾 𝐴𝐿⁄ , and human capital per effective labour ℎ =  
𝐻
𝐴𝐿⁄ . It further 
assumed that certain fractions of output are invested in physical and human capital 
respectively. Let these fractions be 𝑠𝑘 and 𝑠ℎ  for investments in physical capital and 
human capital respectively. Thus, the evolutions of the two capitals per effective 
labour are expressed as: 
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?̇?(0) =  𝑠𝑘𝑦(𝑡) − (𝑛 + 𝑔 +  𝛿)𝑘(𝑡)               (5) 
ℎ̇(0) =  𝑠ℎ𝑦(𝑡) −  (𝑛 + 𝑔 +  𝛿)ℎ(𝑡)               (6) 
Where 𝛿 is depreciation and other variables are as defined above. According to the 
theory, equations (5) and (6) are expected to converge to the steady-state levels of 
capitals that can be expressed as: 
𝑘∗ =  (
𝑠𝑘
1−𝛽
𝑠ℎ
𝛽
𝑛 + 𝑔 +  𝛿
⁄ )
1 1−𝛼−𝛽⁄
        − − − −(7) 
ℎ∗ =  (
𝑠𝑘
𝛼𝑠ℎ
1−𝛼
𝑛 + 𝑔 +  𝛿
⁄ )
1 1−𝛼−𝛽⁄
                   − − − −(8)          
Substituting equations (7) and (8) into output per effective labour and taking the logs 
will yield:  
ln(𝑦) = ln 𝐴(0) +  𝑔𝑡 −  
𝛼 + 𝛽
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
ln(𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) + 
𝛼
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
ln(𝑠𝑘)
+ 
𝛽
1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
ln(𝑠ℎ) − − − (9) 
Equation (9) shows that output per capita is negatively related to population growth, 
positively related to physical capital and human capital.  
The empirical model for this study follows from equation (9), the equilibrium 
augmented Solow model. The term ln 𝐴(0) reflect not just technology but also 
include things like resource endowments, climatic conditions, institutions, and so on, 
hence, these may differ across countries. Therefore, it is assumed that ln 𝐴(0) =  𝛼 +
 𝜀 , where 𝛼 is a constant and 𝜀 is a country specific shock. Thus, the empirical model 
can be written as: 
ln(𝑦) = 𝛼 +  𝑔𝑡 −  𝛾 ln(𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) +  𝜋 ln(𝑠𝑘) +  𝜇 ln(𝑠ℎ) +  𝜀               (10) 
Explicitly, =
𝛼+𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
 , =  
𝛼
1−𝛼−𝛽
 , and 𝜇 =  
𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
 . 
It is assumed that the rates of saving and population growth (𝑠 and 𝑛) are independent 
of the country specific factor 𝜀. The panel data model from equation (10) is therefore 
specified as: 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛sh𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑙𝑛(𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝑔 + 𝛿) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (11) 
Where 𝛼𝑖is time invariant effect unique to each country 𝑖, 𝜃𝑡  is time effect common 
to all countries in period 𝑡, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is individual time varying error distributed 
independently across individuals and independently of all 𝛼𝑖 and 𝜃𝑡 . Equation (11) 
is the baseline model. 
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To test the impact of property rights on growth, a variable measuring property rights 
is introduced to equation (11), specified as:  
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 +  𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑙𝑛sh𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛(𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝑔 + 𝛿) + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛propr𝑖𝑡 +
 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (12) 
To be able to test the convergence of hypothesis, the lag of the dependent variable is 
introduced as explanatory variable in the model. Hence, the dynamic version of the 
baseline model and the property rights augmented model are specified as:  
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛sh𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛(𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝑔 + 𝛿)
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (13) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑙𝑛sh𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛(𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝑔 + 𝛿) +
𝛽4𝑙𝑛propr𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡------(14) 
This study employs different estimation methods, the static models equations (11) 
and (12) are estimated using the OLS, fixed effect and random effect estimators. The 
OLS estimator is consistent only when 𝜀 is not related to the 𝛼 and 𝜃. 
Data for the empirical analysis in this study cover the period 1995 to 2015 for thirty-
six countries in Africa. Though studies on growth are divided between using per 
worker values or per capita values of variables, per capita values are used in this 
study. Thus, real GDP per capita which is obtained from Pen World Table 7.0 is used 
for 𝑦. Investment as share of GDP is used for skit and is obtained from Pen World 
Table 7.0. Gross secondary school enrolment is used to proxy shit and is obtained 
from Africa Development Indicator (ADI) 2011.Population growth is calculated 
using data on population aged 16 to 65 obtained from ADI. We use this age bracket 
because they constitute the working population (not everyone in the economy 
contributes to output). 
 
4. Analytical Framework 
The study first subject the data to a descriptive test to analyse the behaviour of the 
data over the years under study. From the result, it was revealed that the mean of 
capital captured by ratio of fixed capital formation and gross capital product was 
21.89%. This means that an African country allocates less than 30% to investment. 
The mean falls within the minimum and maximum values of 2.78% and 60.16% 
respectivelly showing that the series display a great consistency. Similarly, the 
standard deviation of 8.2551 shows that African countries are very different in terms 
of investment. Also, the skewness shows that the series is normally skewed. The 
result is presented in table 4.1 below. 
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Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
 LCOMP CAPTAL LABOUR RGDPCP PROPRG 
 Mean  5.122176  21.88479  2977454.  5236.493  39.65615 
 Maximum  34.23577  60.15617  59123433  330324.4  75.00000 
 Minimum -16.49508  2.781138  11384.00  106.0170  10.00000 
 Std. Dev.  3.773699  8.255097  9062451.  24591.19  14.01247 
 Skewness  1.213817  1.011501  4.851420  7.707472  0.662975 
 Jarque-Bera  4557.094  247.8462  16365.35  134817.0  48.23790 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
Source: Researcher, 2017. 
The correlation result revealed that all the pairs give coefficients that are less than 
0.5 (50%). The two pairs with the highest coefficients are capital (INVESTM) and 
the aggregation of economic growth, population growth and technological progress 
which gives the coefficient of 0.2039 (20%). This gives the evidence that the 
problem of multicollinearity does not arise in this study. The result is presented in 
table 4.2 below. 
Table 4.2. Correlation Matrix of the Variables 
 LCOMP LCAPTAL LLABOUR RGDPCP PROPRG 
LCOMP  1.000000      
LCAPTAL  0.203837  1.000000     
LLABOUR -0.021308 -0.062614  1.000000    
RGDPCP -0.084924 -0.004754 -0.053485  1.000000   
PROPRG -0.118748  0.015799  0.052410  0.051469  1.000000 
Source: Researcher, 2017. 
Panel Unit Root Test 
Testing for the stationarity property of the variables has been described as 
fundamental for using dynamic panel data model (Chang et al., 2011). In view of 
this, this study adopts panel unit root tests by Levin, Lin and Chu, LLC (2002), Im, 
Pesaran & Shin or IPS (2001) and PP-Fisher (2001). The difference among the three 
tests is that while LLC assumes a common unit root process, IPS and PP-Fisher 
(2001) allow for individual unit root process. The results of all the unit root tests are 
presented in tables 4.3 and 4.4. While table 4.3 contains the results of the unit root 
tests with individual effects only, table 4.4 reports the results of the unit root tests 
with individual effects and linear trend. 
As shown in table 4.3, the result shows that the variables of real per capita GDP, 
investment and intellectual property rights achieve stationarity at first difference 
based on the principles of Im, Pesaran & Shin’s (2003) Wald test, Levin, Lin & 
Chu’s (2002)’s test and Philip, Perron- Fisher’s (2001) test which are available for 
individual effects only. As a result, all the tests reject the null hypothesis that the 
variables contain unit root process at 1% and 5% levels of significance at first 
ISSN: 2065-0175                                                                                              ŒCONOMICA 
181 
difference. The results establish that the variables portray the stationarity processes 
at first differencing (that is, they are all integrated of order one [I(1)]). On the other 
hand, the variables of labour and the aggregation of economic growth, population 
growth rate and technological progress are, however, integrated at levels without 
being differenced. This shows that these variables are integrated of order zero [I(0)]).  
In addition, the results of the stationarity model on individual effects and linear 
trends are reported in table 4.4. This further established the results of the individual 
effects only as the three variables of real per capita GDP, investment and intellectual 
property rights are also stationary at first differencing. However, intellectual 
property rights protection is also stationary at first differencing under this model. 
Still, only the aggregation of population growth rate, technological progress and 
economic growth is stationarity at levels without being differencing. 
Table 4.3. Result of the Panel Unit root Test (Individual Effect Only) 
Variables LLC Breitung IPS PP-Fisher ADF-Fisher 
LCOMP -5.82243*** - -7.89796*** 457.402*** 194.181*** 
LCAPTAL -1.1923 - 0.7238 80.0857 62.4902 
∆LCAPTAL -12.7438*** - -12.9897*** 1143.18*** 308.350*** 
LLABOUR -2.64982*** - 2.9888 123.580*** 66.4069** 
RGDPCP 1.4518 - 6.68338 27.3618 14.7919 
∆RGDPCP -10.2022*** - -8.83745*** 550.250*** 208.946*** 
PROPRG 0.64491 - 1.47172 48.2341 51.1609 
∆PROPRG -4.60334*** - -6.98145*** 127.482*** 321.766*** 
Source: Author, 2017 
Table 4.4. Result of the Panel Unit Root Test (Individual Effect and Linear Trend) 
Variables LLC Breitung IPS PP-Fisher ADF-Fisher 
LCOMP -4.63260*** -4.97987*** -6.40618*** 166.868*** 409.834*** 
LCAPTAL -3.16433*** -2.23042** -1.61114* 100.671** 141.799*** 
LLABOUR 3.8518 3.80995 1.34206 59.5554 336.714*** 
∆ LLABOUR 6.43112** -0.19149 -2.50977*** 274.555*** - 
RGDPCP -3.86490*** -2.16719** -2.30478** 70.5609 89.7466* 
∆RGDPCP - - - 250.109*** 143.414*** 
PROPRG 2.55834 0.50405 0.07338 59.5277 82.3042 
∆PROPRG -5.49559*** -3.14106*** -5.33816*** 125.383*** 297.510*** 
Source: Author, 2017 
From the unit root result, having justified that the pooled OLS, fixed effects and 
random effects models prevalent in the literature are not suitable for the analysis, 
hence, the suitability of the dynamic model of differenced GMM is accepted in the 
present study. 
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The estimation of the effect of intellectual property right on economic growth in 
Africa is therefore presented in table 4.5. From the result, it was shown that the 
protection of intellectual property rights in the previous years has significant and 
positive effect on the current protection of intellectual property rights at 1%. The 
result shows that 1 percent increase in the protection of intellectual property rights 
in the previous one year will induce about 88% increase in the protection of 
intellectual property rights of selected African Countries. This result confirms the 
fact that previous condition of the protection of intellectual property rights is a major 
determinant of the present protection of intellectual property rights condition in the 
economies. Furthermore, it demonstrates the fact that generalized method of 
moments is robust in investigating the relationship between the protection of 
intellectual property rights and economic growth among African countries in 
empirical studies. 
The result in table 4.5 showed a negative relationship between the protection of 
intellectual property rights and economic growth. As shown in table 4.5, the 
coefficient of protection of intellectual property rights is negative and statistically 
significant in all the models at 1%. This indicates that a unit increase in the protection 
of intellectual rights reduces economic growth by 15%. Thus, the empirical results 
establish a negative relationship between the protection of intellectual property rights 
and economic growth among African countries. This means that increase in the level 
of intellectual property rights brings about reduction in economic growth among 
African countries. This result further established the view of the school that 
submitted that African countries are too poor to afford the cost of technological 
products, innovation and services needed for economic growth.  
Having discussed empirically the effects of protection of intellectual property rights 
on economic growth, the control variables are the next. One of the control variables 
employed in the literature is the skilled labour. The result on table 5 shows that 
skilled manpower does have a positive and significant influence on economic growth 
among African countries at 1% level of significance among all the models. This 
shows that if skilled manpower is increased by 1 percent, economic growth among 
African countries goes up by 4 percent. This conforms the a priori expectation that 
the higher the development of labour thereby leading to skilled manpower among 
African countries, the higher the level of economic growth. The result is in 
conformity with most of the existing studies in the literature (Ofili, 2014; Lewer & 
Saenz, 2015). 
Meanwhile, the coefficient of investment (INVESTMT) is positive and significant 
at 1% level of significance. The result showed that 1% increase in the gross fixed 
capital formation will lead to 2% increase in economic growth among African 
countries. This means that increase in investment among African countries has 
increased economic growth thereby validating theoretical submission of positive 
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impact of investment on economic growth. The results also imply that the present 
drive among African countries to entice foreign direct investment in augmenting 
local and internal investment is in the right direction. 
Lastly, the result of the last control variable employed in the study, the aggregation 
of population growth, technological progress and economic growth has positive 
effect on economic growth. This is positive and significant. This means that 
technological progress has increased the real per capita income among African 
countries. 
Table 4.5. The Effect of Intellectual Property Right on Economic Growth in Africa 
 Pool OLS Fixed Two-Step 
  Effects Difference GMM 
LRGDPCPit-1 - - 0.8823*** 
 - - -0.0143 
LPROPRT -0.5343*** -0.5465*** -0.1529*** 
 -0.0684 -0.069 -0.025 
LCOMP 0.00297 0.0034 -0.0112*** 
 -0.0038 -0.0038 -0.00083 
LENROL 0.3393*** 0.3630*** 0.0417*** 
 -0.0265 -0.0272 -0.005 
LINVESTM 0.1991*** 0.1757*** 0.0186*** 
 -0.0451 -0.0454 -0.005 
Constant 3.6636*** 3.3815*** - 
 -0.5425 -0.5174 - 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) test (p-value) - - 0.0082 
AR(2) test (p-value) - - 0.1039 
Hansen test of over-identification (p-
value) - - 0.718 
Hausman Test 0.0000 0.0000 - 
F-Stat (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.1432 0.9505 - 
DW-Statistic 0.0625 1.3261 - 
Source: Author (2017) 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations  
The study investigated the effect of protection of intellectual property rights on 
economic growth among selected African countries between 1995 and 2015 
inclusive using a dynamic panel GMM. The study is motivated by the theoretical 
controversies between two schools; first, the one that believes protection of 
intellectual property positively positives affect economic growth as it encourages 
foreign firms and innovators to bring in innovations, technologies and skilled 
manpower into African countries since they know that their innovations, skills, 
copyrights will be protected. The empirical result on the relationship between the 
protection of intellectual property rights and economic growth reported a negative 
trend thereby confirming the negative relationship submitted by the descriptive and 
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graphical analysis. This shows that the treaty enacted by the World Trade 
Organization in 1995 has yielded negative impacts on the growth of African 
countries thereby establishing the view of the school that submitted that African 
countries have low per capita income and hence, inability to purchase the necessary 
trademarks, innovations, copyrights and technological skills needed for African 
countries’ economic growth. The study concludes that the selected countries in 
Africa have not enjoyed the benefits of intellectual property right on the growth of 
their economy over the years under study. The study therefore recommends that the  
African countries, while complying with the WTO treaty on strengthening IPR to 
attract investment and growth, they should also not lose sight of the strategies 
employed by developed countries in their early stage of development when 
intellectual right protection was weak. 
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